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ABSTRACT
Internet of Things (IoT) is a system that consists of a large number
of smart devices connected through a network. The number of
these devices is increasing rapidly, which creates a massive and
complex network with a vast amount of data communicated over
that network. One way to protect this data in transit, i.e., to achieve
data confidentiality, is to use lightweight encryption algorithms for
IoT protocols. However, the design and implementation of such
protocols is an error-prone task; flaws in the implementation can
lead to devastating security vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities
can be exploited by an attacker and affect users’ privacy. There ex-
ist various techniques to verify software and detect vulnerabilities.
Bounded Model Checking (BMC) and Fuzzing are useful techniques
to check the correctness of a software system concerning its specifi-
cations. Here we describe a framework called Encryption-BMC and
Fuzzing (EBF ) using combined BMC and fuzzing techniques. We
evaluate the application of EBF verification framework on a case
study, i.e., the S-MQTT protocol, to check security vulnerabilities
in cryptographic protocols for IoT.
1 INTRODUCTION
Internet of Things (IoT) is a system that consists of a large number of
smart devices and objects, such as RFID tags, sensors, actuators, and
smartphones, which communicate with each other with minimum
human interventions [37]. These smart devices can connect through
Wifi, Bluetooth, and RFID [37]. Additionally, these devices have
embedded sensors or RFID tags to send and receive data. IoT covers
different areas and applications, such as smart homes, cities, and
smart health care [22]. According to Singh et al. [37], the number
of objects in IoT, excluding computers, tablets, and cellphones,
will create US $300 billion revenue until 2020. Singh et al. also
pointed out that by 2020, the number of cellphones and tablets
will be around 7.3 billion devices [37]. These objects will create a
massive and complex network with a considerable amount of data
communicated over this network [10, 35]. The existence of such a
vast network of connected devices will pose new security, privacy,
and trust issues, which put users at high risk [37].
One of the ways to protect data in transit, thus achieve data con-
fidentiality, is by designing bespoke lightweight encryption algo-
rithms for IoT devices [8]. Due to limitations in IoT devices such as
power consumption, low memory life, low processing speed [5, 34],
lightweight encryption algorithms, such as PRESENT [16], Hum-
mingbird [24], and WG-8 [25], have different properties than tradi-
tional encryption algorithms such as AES [23] and RSA [26]. Thus,
different types of lightweight encryption algorithms exist, which
are suitable for IoT devices. These algorithms have a small key/block
size and many rounds [12]. However, implementing encryption for
protocols is an error-prone task [40]; flaws in the implementation
can lead to devastating security vulnerabilities [40]. According to
the Common Vulnerability and Exposure (CVE) [21], the number of
vulnerabilities reported in 2018 is 16555, more than double what was
reported in 2016 (i.e., 6447). An attacker can exploit these security
vulnerabilities and affect users’ privacy.
There exist various techniques for finding such vulnerabilities [17,
28]. For example, fuzzing [28] is an automated software testing
technique that involves providing invalid or unexpected values as
inputs to a program. Another popular technique is bounded model
checking (BMC) [13], which can detect bugs by using symbolic
values. The basic idea of BMC is to check the negation of a given
property at a given depth. However, both fuzzing and BMC have
not yet been exploited to detect vulnerabilities in implementations
of lightweight cryptographic protocols for IoT devices. In particu-
lar, performing fuzzing and BMC alone is inadequate in achieving
high-path coverage efficiently. BMC struggles in reaching deep
parts of the code because of the state-space explosion issue and
its dependency on Boolean Satisfiability (SAT) [40] or Satisfiability
Modulo Theories (SMT) solvers [38]. Fuzzing also has its drawbacks
as it is unable to examine all code paths [39].
We make two significant contributions towards the verification
of cryptographic protocols in IoT devices. First, we combine fuzzing
and BMC in an unprecedented manner to increase code coverage
and to detect a maximum number of security vulnerabilities of
cryptographic protocols in IoT. Precisely, we execute the program
under test using a BMC engine for a particular amount of time.
After the first round of BMC, we aim to cover all the functions
through various inputs. However, due to limitations in the under-
lying solvers, BMC can only reach shallow coverage (i.e., it never
reaches branches that lie deep in the code) [31]. To solve the issue
of the shallow coverage of BMC, as the next step of our technique,
we use the inputs or packets in case of protocols generated by BMC
as seed inputs for the fuzzer. In contrast to Ognawala et al. [31]
who combine symbolic execution and apply fuzzing to general-
purpose software, our proposed method starts with BMC and then
use fuzzing by considering intricate properties in IoT protocols.
Second, we perform a preliminary evaluation of the application of
the Encryption-BMC and Fuzzing (ESF ) verification framework to
detect security vulnerabilities in implementations of cryptographic
protocols for IoT. Although our EBF prototype is not entirely im-
plemented, its application to go beyond design correctness and also
to address behavior correctness represents an important research
direction in ensuring secure IoT protocols.
2 PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Lightweight cryptographic protocols for
IoT devices
Lightweight encryption is suggested as a concept to handle secu-
rity in resource constraint devices such as IoT devices [32]. This
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lightweight encryption is based on the traditional principles of
cryptography, but its purpose is to design algorithms, which have
stricter requirements than other algorithms in terms of perfor-
mance. They must be ultra-efficient as they will be run on devices
with low computational capabilities [32]. Thus, they can be used in
the IoT protocols to secure communication between two endpoints.
Encryption schemes can be divided into two main categories: (1)
Symmetric key encryption, which uses the same key for both en-
cryption and decryption [12] such as AES [23], DES and 3DES [30];
and (2) Asymmetric key encryption, which uses different keys, a
public key for encryption and private key for decryption [12], such
as RSA [9] and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) [32]. We eval-
uate our EBF prototype on the Secure Message Queue Telemetry
Transport (S-MQTT) protocol [14]. S-MQTT is a messaging trans-
port protocol for IoT devices, which uses Transport Layer Security
(TLS) [36] that support different types of cipher suite such as AES.
2.2 Software verification for lightweight
cryptographic protocols
Here we focus on verifying lightweight cryptographic protocols for
IoT devices using fuzzing and BMC to detect security vulnerabilities.
Given the current knowledge in software verification, our proposed
verification algorithm is the first to address the implementation
aspects of cryptographic protocols for IoT devices, such as mem-
ory leak and buffer overflow. In implementations of lightweight
cryptographic protocols, a memory leak may occur if the developer
unintentionally fails to free an assigned block of memory when
that chunk of memory is no longer needed [41]. Another typical
implementation error is buffer overflow, which happens when a
program attempts to write more data and exceeds the length of
the allocated memory. In any particular case, the attacker then
can exploit these vulnerabilities and affect the system. For example,
Cisco found a vulnerability in the cryptographic driver for Adaptive
Security Appliance Software (ASA) and Firepower Threat Defense
(FTD) Software [19]. This vulnerability occurred because of the
insufficient input validation of a Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) or TLS
packet header. It allows the attacker to reboot the device suddenly,
which will result in a denial of service (DoS) condition [18].
2.2.1 Fuzzing. Fuzzing is an automated security vulnerabilities de-
tector technique, which works by feeding protocol implementations
with random or semi-random inputs [28]. The specification of the
software does not foresee these inputs. Then, the system behavior is
checked for abnormalities, such as crashes or failures. [39]. Fuzzing
often suffers from a low code coverage dilemma [33]. Fuzzing can de-
tect implementation level flaws, but it cannot find design issues. For
example, fuzzing can detect buffer overflow, but it cannot detect the
use of weak encryption algorithm [15]. In terms of cryptographic
protocols, we can fuzz a running protocol that uses encryption with
invalid packets and check the connection behavior of the client
and server. In our proposed verification method, we provide to our
fuzzer the necessary cryptographic keys/algorithms in a log file.
2.2.2 Bounded Model Checking (BMC). A principal aim of BMC in
the context of software verification is to examine bounded program
runs and thus generate verification conditions (VCs) that reflect the
exact path in which a statement is executed, the context in which
a given function is called, and the bit-accurate representation of
expressions [13, 20]. A VC is a logical formula (constructed from a
bounded program and desired correctness properties), whose valid-
ity implies that a program’s behavior agrees with its specification.
Correctness properties, in programs, can be specified by users via
assert statements or automatically generated from a specification
language. If all of a bounded program’s VCs are valid, then it com-
plies with its specification, up to a given bound. For cryptographic
protocols, we deal with symbolic packet instead of regular input.
Our BMC engine will initially explore the cryptographic functions,
which will help the fuzzer to examine the paths deeply.
3 DETECTING VULNERABILITIES IN
IMPLEMENTATIONS OF LIGHTWEIGHT
CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOLS
A large number of recent attacks targeting improper implementa-
tions of cryptographic protocols, such as man-in-the-middle and
side-channel attacks [39], has motivated us to provide security anal-
ysis of cryptographic protocols such as S-MQTT [14]. Here we
develop a novel verification algorithm to detect vulnerabilities such
as buffer overflow and memory leak using fuzzing and BMC tech-
niques. The novelty of our approach does not rely only on a scalable
and precise verification method to check for implementation er-
rors but also in the application domain due to the importance of
securing IoT and its respective lack of research on finding security
vulnerabilities in cryptographic protocol implementations. There-
fore, the main objective of our proposed method is to overcome the
limitations of fuzzing and BMC in isolation, such as low-code cover-
age and state-space explosion resp., by combining them to achieve
precision and scalability in an unprecedented manner. We aim to
apply our method to ensure the safety and security of IoT software
and also evaluate the effectiveness of this method by determining
the code coverage and the number of found vulnerabilities. Lastly,
we aim to analyze and compare the results with other verification
tools such as Csur [27] and CDF [9], which are designed to verify
traditional cryptographic protocols. As a result, our ultimate goal
is to detect implementation and behavior errors in cryptographic
protocol implementations by combining fuzzing and BMC, thus
improving safety and security in IoT devices.
3.1 Encryption-BMC and Fuzzing (EBF ) Method
Here we describe our EBF verification method, which combines
fuzzing with BMC in an unprecedented manner. Our EBF method
can be described as follows:
(1) We symbolically execute the initial state of the cryptographic
protocol implementation (e.g., the S-MQTT implementation).
Since we are dealing with protocols, we will use packets
instead of regular inputs to our BMC engine to produce test
cases that can exercise different program paths.
(2) We expect to cover most program paths using symbolic pack-
ets after the first round of the BMC engine. To create sym-
bolic packets, we will replace some bytes of concrete packets
by symbolic values.
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Figure 1: EBF : overall methodology.
(3) We use the inputs generated by BMC as seed inputs for
the fuzzing tool in the form of a test case. These test cases
contain symbolic values, but we do not expect them to reveal
any vulnerabilities. These test cases will be regenerated with
concrete values extracted from the BMC engine, to feed them
to the fuzzer engine for the second round.
(4) We start a protocol session between two endpoints to share
encrypted messages (which is the important part we want
to test in the fuzzing stage) and pass the test cases to the
running protocol to check for irregularity, e.g., denial-of-
service. The server will also generate inputs and pass them
to the fuzzer to ensure the exploration of all the paths. Then
the fuzzer will mutate the inputs and send them to the client.
(5) Our fuzzer reads the required keys and cryptographic algo-
rithms to mutate encrypted messages properly from a log
file to explore different unique paths, which were initially
difficult to reach. This particular log file will be automatically
exported from the server implementation; it will contain the
key and the encryption algorithm used.
(6) If the fuzzer explored all the paths that BMC had difficulty
to cover and used all the inputs generated from BMC, then
it can collect and save the results within the log file.
Figure 1 illustrates our EBF verification method. We will build
our EBF verification framework on top of two tools to implement
our methodology; these tools have been chosen based on the com-
parison by Beyer et al. [11] between testing and model checking.
In the BMC phase, we will use the ESBMC tool for the initial state
exploration to search for various implementation errors, including
memory leak and buffer overflow. We then will use the AFL tool for
the fuzzing phase to complete the verification by testing running
sessions for the cryptographic protocol. In order to provide the
fuzzer with the necessary keys and encryption algorithm, we will
develop a file, which the fuzzer can read such information from and
also implement a code to analyze the verification results.
3.1.1 Illustrative Example. As an illustrative example, we describe
our part of the EBF verification framework using the S-MQTT
protocol. In the first step of our method, we use our BMC engine
to check for errors in the S-MQTT implementation for a short
amount of time. Then we check whether the engine finds some
vulnerabilities by collecting the log results. After that, we take the
test cases generated by the BMC phase and feed them to the fuzzer
as the second step. Fuzzer will use the test cases as input. Then we
execute the protocol and feed the client with the invalid inputs and
check its behavior. The client communicates with the server using
encrypted messages; if the server decrypts messages correctly, then
it passes the encryption key to the log file. Also, the server will
generate invalid inputs and pass them to the fuzzer to ensure the
exploration of all the paths, particularly the paths BMC could not
reach. By combining both techniques, we expect to cover most
paths in the code.
3.1.2 Preliminary Evaluation. Here we only will evaluate two parts
of our EBF methodology. First, we will evaluate the BMC engine as
illustrated in Figure 1 by evaluating the ESBMC tool [1]. Second,
we will evaluate fuzzing by evaluating AFL tool [2]. We used Paho
MQTT client implementation V1.3.1 (Synchronous and Asynchro-
nous modes) [3] and Mosquitto MQTT server V1.6.7 [4], which
support TLS V1.3. The main objective of this initial evaluation is
to check whether the ESBMC and AFL tools are promising tools to
be further developed in terms of verifying cryptographic protocols.
The first implementation, which is the synchronous mode, con-
sists of 61 functions, and the second one is an asynchronous mode,
which consists of 77 functions. In Figure 2, we can see the number
of functions, which were verified successfully, and which functions
ESBMC detected a bug in them. Most bugs found were array bounds
and invalid pointer; as future work, we will validate these bugs
based on witness checking, as part of our methodology, and also
confirm these bugs with the developers. However, regarding the
time, the entire implementation required around one hour to be
tested by ESBMC. Thus, the average time of each function in both
modes was around one second, as shown in figure 2.
As example, we considered a simple code fragment of function
MQTTClient_f reeMessaдe in MQTT synchronous mode imple-
mentation, this function frees the memory allocated to an MQTT
message, including the additional memory allocated to the message
payload. However, the developer of this function does not check
whether the pointer passed as argument toMQTTClient_messaдe
points to an a live object. Figure 3 illustrates a fragment of the
counterexample produced by ESBMC for the function in Listing
1. One way to fix this pointer dereference failure is to ensure that
message is different than NULL. As the next step in our EBF method,
we initially evaluate AFL. We manually generated three test cases
as a start and fed them to the tool. Unfortunately, AFL required a
long time to find crashes, e.g., almost one day running, and still,
did not find any crashes (cf. Figure 4). AFL needs further evaluation
and development in terms of cryptographic protocols in the next
stage of our research.
1 void MQTTClient_freeMessage(MQTTClient_message ** message)
2 {
3 FUNC_ENTRY;
4 MQTTProperties_free (&(* message)->properties);
5 free ((* message)->payload);
6 free(* message);
7 *message = NULL;
8 FUNC_EXIT;
9 }
Listing 1: Fragment of code of MQTTClient
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Figure 2: Numbers of functions tested and verification time.
Figure 3: Counterexample for function MQTTClient
freeMessage.
Figure 4: Fuzzing MQTT protocol session between publisher
(client) and broker (server) using AFL.
4 LIMITATIONS, RELATEDWORK AND
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Many IoT applications depend on complicated cryptographic proto-
cols for communicating over an insecure Internet. The C program-
ming language is mostly used in writing cryptographic software [6].
Both the design and implementation of cryptographic primitives
such as encryption and hash functions are error-prone. However,
flaws in the implementation can lead to devastating security vul-
nerabilities, which may be exploited by an attacker [40]. Recent
years have seen a real development in software verification of cryp-
tographic protocols, as witnessed by the development of different
tools either in BMC or fuzzing techniques [6]. However, there exists
still a need for further development of these tools. Although the
obligation to verify cryptographic protocols is now well identified,
a few recent studies try to suggest solutions.
One of the attempts to verify cryptographic primitive using sym-
bolic execution is Csur [27], which analyzes C code for security
properties using a set of horn clauses, which are then solved using
a theorem prover. One of the limitations of this method is that
the results are only valid in a symbolic model of cryptography
proposed by Dolev and Yao [29]. Also, Vanhoef and Piessens [40]
modified the KLEE tool to efficiently handle cryptographic protocol
by simulating their behavior under the Dolev-Yao model. Aizatulin
et al. [6, 7] combined symbolic execution with proof techniques by
using it to obtain a ProVerif model from a cryptographic protocol
implementation in C. However, the limitation of their technique is
that it only considers a single execution path. Another tool used to
verify cryptographic primitives using fuzzing is CDF [9], which can
be used to achieve security verification, and in particular, to find
logic bugs with standard specifications. It uses differential fuzzing
technique, to find inconsistencies between two implementations
of the same primitive, e.g., between two implementations of RSA
cipher [9]. One of the weaknesses of CDF is that it provides lim-
ited detection of timing leaks. ESPIKE [15] is another fuzzing tool,
which is an extension of SPIKE; it is designed to handle encrypted
protocols by sending all the SPIKE data through the SSL layer. The
limitation of SPIKE is that it is only valid for the protocols that are
already compatible with SPIKE.
In general, the main challenge of fuzzing is that it is not di-
rectly applicable to encryption because exchanging encrypted mes-
sages include randomly generated numbers or symbols [39]. Con-
sidering that mutating encrypted messages always lead to a non-
understandable format, the fuzzer needs to have access to the en-
cryption key and the cryptographic algorithm used in the protocol.
Thus, in our proposed EBF method, the server automatically trans-
mits the information required for decryption (i.e., encryption keys
and the cryptographic algorithm used in the protocol) from a log
file to the fuzzer. State-of-the-art methods employed only fuzzing or
symbolic execution for cryptographic network protocols; none of
them ever considered BMC techniques, which outperform typical
path-based symbolic execution [11]. Given the current knowledge
in software verification and applied cryptography, this is the first
method that combines BMC and fuzzing to detect software vulner-
abilities for cryptographic protocols in IoT. We expect by designing
this algorithm that we efficiently cover most code paths and avoid
the path explosion issue. Moreover, we intend to develop an auto-
mated method that finds the most common kinds of vulnerabilities.
As future work, we will implement our entire methodology. In
the beginning, we will evaluate ESBMC in the TLS library and
validate any bugs ESBMC finds, based on witness checking and
later confirmation by developers. Then, we will further develop and
evaluate AFL when two endpoints are sharing encrypted messages.
Last, we will create the log file to automatically provide AFL with
the encryption key ad algorithm used and report the result.
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